**2023年国际政治经济学最佳论文TOP10候选论文摘要**

**（一）中文候选论文摘要**

**PC01 国际能源大变局下的中国能源安全 冯玉军（2023），《国际经济评论》，第1期，第38-52页。**

当前，世界能源体系受到能源技术革命、全球能源转型、新冠病毒感染疫情蔓延以及俄乌危机持续等一系列因素的影响，既经历着全球能源生产消费格局加速调整、人类能源消费日益低碳化的历史性变化，也呈现出世界能源市场急剧波动、国际能源地缘政治竞争加剧的阶段性场景。在世界能源体系的变局之下，维护中国能源安全既迎来诸多机遇，也面临新的挑战。国际能源大变局下，中国需要着眼世界趋势、立足本国国情，从底层逻辑入手拓宽视野和思路，推动能源消费革命、供给革命、技术革命、体制革命，全方位加强国际合作，实现开放条件下的能源安全。

**PC02 霸权护持与超越——高科技产业全球价值链竞争的政治经济学 刘洪钟（2023），《世界经济与政治》，第2期，第128-154页。**

以半导体为主的高科技产业竞争是中美两国竞争的关键领域。与工业化时代不同，在全球分工深度融合发展的当今时代，中美高科技产业竞争是一种融合了技术竞争、制造能力竞争和市场竞争的混合竞争，综合体现为对全球价值链主导权的争夺。通过构建技术、制造能力和市场“三位一体”的全球价值链权力模型，从理论层面考察了全球价值链中权力的来源和权力竞争的本质，霸权国的权力垄断形成于对三者的体系性控制，但崛起国的后发优势则使其有机会通过技术撬动、制造能力提升和市场权力俘获而改变价值链中的单极权力结构，形成与主导国的权力平衡和对称性竞争。日美和中美半导体产业竞争的不同境况对上述理论提供了有力证据。日本通过技术赶超和制造能力提升实现了半导体产业的崛起，但市场权力的缺乏使其无法形成对该产业的体系性控制，从而在面对美国霸权胁迫时无力掌控自己的命运。中国在半导体产业的制造能力和技术能力虽然还处于赶超阶段，但巨大的国内市场规模使其能够与缺乏制造能力的美国形成双向非对称相互依赖关系，从而为中国在全球价值链中最终实现与美国的平等竞争关系奠定了现实基础。

**PC03 大国竞争时代美国对华科技战略探析 龙春生、袁征（2023），《美国研究》，第4期，第47-72页。**

自特朗普政府伊始，美国回归大国竞争战略，将中国视作美国主要的“战略竞争对手”。不同于以往的大国竞争格局，中美战略竞争主要集中在经济、科技、数字基建等“低政治”领域，特别是科技领域正在成为中美战略竞争的主战场。美国为了在科技竞争中占据全面优势，其对华科技战略采取了“内部自强”和“外部制衡”的双重选项。这一战略在充分发挥美国科技制度、资源和环境优势下，将政府、思想库、新闻媒体、私营企业、科研机构、盟友伙伴等各方力量协同起来，综合运用立法、行政、司法、社会动员、外交等手段。但美国对华科技战略的推行并非一帆风顺，在很大程度上将受到国内外因素的掣肘。美国对华科技战略将维护美国全球科技领先地位与维护美国国家安全等同起来，着力凸显科技的安全属性，不断渲染“中国威胁论”，呈现出一种“泛安全化”的发展趋势，而这种趋势将给中国的科技发展与国家安全带来一系列挑战。

**PC04 战略竞争、出口管制与中美高技术产品贸易 宋国友、张纪腾（2023），《世界经济与政治》，第3期，第2-31页。**

随着美国对华战略竞争步伐日益加快，高技术出口管制被美国视为打压中国和护持自身技术霸权的重要政策工具。然而对相关数据的分析显示，中美高技术贸易不仅仍在继续进行，而且在部分领域甚至有所增加。整体而言，美国对华经济战略一直在安全逻辑和发展逻辑之间寻求平衡，在两类逻辑的共同作用下，威胁性、互利性、替代性和自主性塑造了美国对华技术出口管制的政策选择。尽管威胁性在美国对华技术出口管制的决策中占据着首要地位，但中美在高技术产品贸易上的互利性、中国自其他国家进口高技术产品的替代性和中国在相关技术领域不断提升的自主性不同程度地抑制了美国大规模限制高技术产品对华出口的冲动。这一机制在对中美半导体制造设备贸易案例的考察中得到了验证，而半导体制造技术在美国当前对华技术出口管制中处于核心地位。厘清战略竞争背景下美国对华出口管制决策的影响因素，能够为理解中美博弈的复杂性、中美高技术产品贸易的相互依赖性以及美国对华技术“脱钩”的有限性提供有益视角。

**PC05 美欧全球基建计划协调对‘一带一路’倡议的影响与中国应对 邹磊（2023），《国际经济评论》，第2期，第85-108页。**

伴随着“一带一路”倡议的深入实施，美欧接连提出“重建更美好世界”（B3W）、“全球基础设施和投资伙伴关系”（PGII）和“全球门户”等全球基建计划，基建投资正成为大国竞争的重要内容。作为美欧涉华政策协调的组成部分，双方借助七国集团峰会和美欧“贸易与技术委员会”等机制，围绕投资规则、融资模式和项目布局加强协调，谋求提供“一带一路”倡议的“替代方案”。总体来看，美欧对“一带一路”倡议的挑战主要体现在舆论施压、规则壁垒和项目竞争三个层面，但也面临资金兑现度存疑、内部协调难度大、发展中国家无意选边站等问题，对“一带一路”倡议的联合制衡存在多重限度，未来三者很可能长期处于竞争性共存状态。针对“一带一路”倡议与美欧计划的“强竞争—弱协调”关系，中国既要灵活主动应对美欧攻势，也要积极探索彼此合作空间。

**PC06 经济制裁与反经济制裁国际合作 叶研（2023），《外交评论》，第1期，第26-53页。**

近年来，美西方频繁地将经济制裁作为武器，对广大发展中国家实施经济“孤立”政策，以达到其特定的政治目的。由“被制裁者困境”所决定，发展中国家目前单独采取的一系列反经济制裁措施的效果都差强人意。反经济制裁国际合作萌芽于各国的反单边经济制裁实践，通过构建全球以被制裁企业为核心的经济网络，力争同以美国企业为核心的经济制裁企业网络相抗衡。在全球性的“反经济制裁企业网络”出现后，美国的单边经济制裁就成了它自身的“掘墓人”。对中国而言，构建以反经济制裁企业网络为目标的反经济制裁国际合作，能够有效降低美国经济制裁对中国经济在两个方面的负面影响，从宏观战略和微观经济层面有效避免中美经济在短期内全面“脱钩”，在政治、经济、外交和策略层面都具有其他反经济制裁措施所无法比拟的巨大优势，是当前能够采取的最好的反经济制裁解决方案。

**PC07 对华技术性贸易壁垒与国家经济安全 郑休休、刘青、赵忠秀（2023），《国际经济评论》，第1期，第131-151页。**

技术性贸易壁垒是各国变相实施贸易保护主义的新形式。对华技术性贸易壁垒具有覆盖产品种类广泛、欧美主导和彼此效仿的特征，并呈现出聚焦能源和环境议题、向价值链上游环节延伸的趋势。壁垒形成受经济、政治、技术、外交因素驱动，是国家利益在特定市场发生竞争性冲突的结果。对华技术性贸易壁垒通过直接影响中国微观主体参与国际贸易的经济行为，引发国内行业维度、地区维度的结构性调整，并通过产品市场与劳动力市场的均衡作用、国外市场与国内市场的内外联动等途径影响国民经济运行的稳定状态，从而深刻影响国家经济安全。中国应当在管理制度改革、信息传递、基础研究、技术标准国际化建设等方面采取具有针对性的优化措施以妥善应对现存问题。

**PC08 从TPP到IPEF：美国亚太经济战略的制度创新 赵菩（2023），《现代国际关系》，第3期，第46-61页。**

国际制度的“武器化”缘于大国利用国际制度以实现本国私利的倾向。它是一国基于对制度收益的权衡，针对竞争对手所采取的一系列国际制度行动。美国为应对中国崛起实施的国际经济制度战略进一步彰显了国际制度“武器化”的趋势。自美国对华态度从“接触”转为“竞争”以来，奥巴马、特朗普与拜登三任美国政府在“竞赢中国”这一相同战略目标下选择了迥异的国际制度行动。这种差异缘于他们权衡个人选举利益和国家战略利益之后所形成的不同制度战略偏好，进而塑造了其能够实现自身目标诉求的有效方略。奥巴马在较小选举压力下能够着重追求战略利益，全力推动旨在“规锁”中国的TPP谈判；特朗普发动的对华“贸易战”是选举利益主导下以制度破坏方略对中国进行的直接打击；拜登试图在选举利益和战略目标之间保持平衡，从而创新国际制度，利用制度组伴方略推出IPEF这一区域合作架构，在最大程度上保全自己选举利益的同时选用新型“制度武器”助力同中国的战略竞争。

**PC09 中美技术竞争与中国周边经济秩序变革——以中水平技术优势塑造中国周边经济结构 高程、薛琳（2023），《世界经济与政治》，第10期，第16-43页。**

中美技术竞争是中美战略博弈的重要表现，中美技术竞争的核心不仅在于谁的技术更前沿，更在于谁能运用现有技术开拓更广阔和更为纵深的市场，对更多国家辐射更大影响力，从而在新一轮全球产业价值链重塑中占据优势地位。中美在前沿技术领域的竞争主要集中在发达国家市场，这是中国的相对短板；而在广大发展中国家市场，成本更低、性价比更好和适用性更强的中水平技术具有更广阔的发展空间，这是中国的相对优势所在。作者由此建立了一个大国技术竞争的分析框架，重点围绕技术后发国家与技术先发国家在技术落后国家的竞争逻辑和大国利用技术手段塑造周边经济秩序的一般路径，从技术适应性和技术竞争优势两个维度分析中国能够在周边地区与美国的技术竞争取得成功的原因：中国在周边地区有效利用了中水平技术优势，通过技术投资优化区域产业价值结构，并利用技术出口优化区域经济发展环境，在与美国的技术竞争取得了一定优势，逐渐提升了在周边经济秩序构造中的战略地位。运用华为公司依靠竞争优势开拓泰国市场和中国在周边布局铁路技术以改善周边经济发展环境两个案例对上述框架进行实证检验，可以发现中国正着力发挥中水平技术优势扩展周边市场，并以此逐步健全一个相对自主的中国—周边产业链、完善周边经济发展环境，这是中国借助技术手段重塑周边经济秩序、塑造周边战略的关键。

**PC10 美国对华半导体产业链竞争：东亚地区的视角 李金锋（2023），《外交评论》，第3期，第51-77页。**

基于对美国及东亚地区半导体产业链发展态势的判断，拜登政府积极拉拢韩国、日本以及中国台湾地区组建“半导体联盟”，加强对华半导体产业链竞争。美国此举主要出于三重动因：维护美国主导下的等级制半导体产业链体系，遏阻中国向产业链高端延伸；借机汲取东亚地区优势资源，增强美国半导体供应链韧性和产业霸权；收拢针对中国半导体产业的围堵网。为此，美国重视“相对收益”，一面要求东亚地区盟友及伙伴配合美国围堵中国，另一面要求其提交半导体生产数据，向美国转移先进产能及技术，并与美国开展联合技术研发。而韩国、日本以及中国台湾地区均从自身利益出发，对美国“半导体联盟”做出有所保留的政策回应，利益分歧势必制约美国对华半导体产业链战略布局的发展前景。为应对半导体产业链竞争，中国应当加强政治层面的对外战略沟通，更需要锤炼内功，畅通国内国际双循环，优化半导体融资及人才机制，明确政府、高校、科研机构及企业在国家科技创新体系中的定位与分工，从根本上增强半导体产业链韧性和竞争力。

**PC11 国际政治经济竞争范式的转变：从全球价值链到战略价值链 余南平、栾心蔚（2023），《欧洲研究》，第4期，第79-102页。**

当今世界正处于一个拐点，颠覆性技术革新挑战传统全球价值链的组织形态，地缘政治的紧张局势迅速改变了全球价值链所处的环境，各种合力作用推动着世界各国的价值链战略向安全维度转变。全球价值链带来的非对称贸易和相互依赖，成为国家进行地缘政治竞争的工具和武器。欧美评估了各自关键价值链的脆弱性和安全性，并从政策层面促进供应链的自主化和泛欧美区域化，使得国家行为体从战略高度推动价值链构建的局势逐渐明朗。“战略价值链”分析框架有助于理解技术和地缘政治互动下，国家行为体在构建和重塑全球价值链中的作用，而以国家安全为目标的战略价值链构建必将带来国际政治经济范式的新变化。

**PC12 地缘政治竞争为何复兴? 王正毅（2023），《国际政治研究》，第6期，第11-29页。**

地缘政治作为主权国家维护和拓展生存空间的一种战略手段，是国际体系权力结构稳定与变革的晴雨表。当国家之间采取相互合作的地缘政治战略时，国际体系的权力结构通常处于相对稳定状态；而当国家之间采取相互竞争的地缘政治战略时，表明国际体系的权力结构处于危机状态或出现变革的态势。基于国际政治经济学折中主义的视角，通过对资本主义世界体系的基本特征及其在当代的表现形态、资本主义世界体系的结构性危机，以及资本主义世界体系的周期性变化详细分析，可以发现，无休止地追求资本积累是资本主义的本质特征，单一的世界经济和多重的国家体系是国家之间进行地缘政治合作或地缘政治竞争的内在动力，而资本主义世界体系固有的结构性危机及周期性变化（特别是康德拉季耶夫周期和霸权周期），则是2008年全球金融危机之后地缘政治竞争复兴和加剧的根本原因。

**PC13 统合内政—外交双重逻辑——中美竞争背景下拜登政府国家供应链安全战略 王浩、宋天阳（2023），《美国研究》，第1期，第82-112页。**

供应链安全已成为美国内政外交战略性议题。究其缘由，新冠肺炎疫情对全球供应链的冲击及其暴露的美国供应链风险是诱因，以供应链为纽带的中美产业技术竞争催生的霸权焦虑是根源。因此，拜登政府国家供应链安全战略是中美竞争背景下霸权护持的新探索。文章从供应链安全与美国对外政策内外逻辑互动的既有研究出发，构建了一个统合内政—外交双重逻辑的分析折中主义框架，对该战略进行探讨。概言之，其生成以内外互通为逻辑，在维护美国经济安全与科技优势、助推中产阶级利益导向的国内改革和重建新政联盟以强化对华长期竞争的经济与政治基础的同时，以重塑全球供应链体系和拓展盟伴关系强化对华长期竞争的外交与战略基础。其布局以内外互补为逻辑，将产业技术政策与供应链安全联盟战略紧密配合以分别推动供应链回流和友岸外包。其特点、影响与局限内外互联，表现为经济上的国家资本主义、政治上的民粹主义、外交上的伪多边主义及战略上的供应链安全化—意识形态化，在冲击全球供应链体系、加剧逆全球化与深化中美竞争的同时面临美国国内经济压力与政治极化、外交上联盟内部张力及战略上产业技术分工市场规律的结构性制约，因而该战略能否成为美国对华竞争新抓手需密切关注。

**PC14 国际制度融合与全球经济治理体系改革 任琳、张尊月（2023），《世界经济与政治》，第10期，第77-103页。**

相较于以往导致国际制度复杂性出现的客观成因，目前的国际制度复杂性主要是由大国主观塑造产生的，是大国博弈在全球治理领域中的具体显现。规避国际制度冲突并塑造国际制度间的融合日益成为推动全球经济治理体系改革的核心议题。作者分析了霸权国与新兴大国之间是否更难实现国际制度融合的问题。研究发现，欧洲稳定机制与国际货币基金组织之间的国际制度融合度远低于预期，而清迈倡议（多边化国际制度）与国际货币基金组织之间的国际制度融合度却高于预期，这主要是因为国际制度的主导国或倡议国之间存在的所谓“志同道合”盟友关系并不是促进国际制度融合的必然前提，霸权国与新兴大国各自主导或倡议的国际制度之间也能实现融合。除国家逻辑和市场逻辑外，区域逻辑在国际制度的融合中也可发挥主要作用。在货币金融议题领域，从区域化到全球化的整合方式有望成为未来全球经济治理体系改革的可选路径。

**PC15 拜登政府半导体产业政策：路径、影响与制约 宫小飞（2023），《美国研究》，第5期，第105-127页。**拜登执政后，美国推行了一系列半导体产业政策，通过补贴先进制造业、加大研发投入、增加劳动力供给、实施抑制性产业政策、组建产业联盟等方式，加大对半导体产业的干预。拜登政府半导体产业政策遵循特定的安全逻辑、政治逻辑和霸权逻辑，旨在增强美国半导体供应链的安全，服务于其“中产阶级优先”政策，助力美国对华战略竞争。鉴于美国在全球半导体供应链中的强大存在，拜登政府强化半导体产业政策将推动半导体供应链从全球化走向本土化，阻滞全球半导体供应链的创新升级。美国的抑他性半导体产业政策在冲击中国半导体供应链安全的同时，也“倒逼”中国半导体产业发展和技术创新。拜登政府半导体产业政策背后的国家干预市场模式不仅受到本土劳动力短缺的掣肘，也因其浓厚的“美国优先”色彩而难以得到盟友的支持，且无法满足半导体企业对效益最大化的追求，其实施效果仍有待观察。

**（二）英文候选论文摘要**

**PE01 Economic costs of the Russia‐Ukraine war. Liadze, I., Macchiarelli, C., Mortimer‐Lee, P., & Juanino, P. S. (2023). *The World Economy, 46*(4), 874-886.**

The unprovoked and brutal invasion of Ukraine by Russia on 24 February 2022 is imposing a terrible human cost. In this paper, we use the National Institute Global Econometric Model (NiGEM) to quantify the impact of the war on the global economy. The war represents a massive cost, equivalent to 1% of global GDP in 2022, or about $1.5 trillion valued at purchasing power parity exchange rates (PPP), compared with our GDP forecast made at the beginning of 2022. Europe is the region affected most, given trade links its proximity to Ukraine and Russia and its reliance on energy and food supplies from those countries. GDP in Europe is expected to shrink by more than 1% in 2022 compared with our forecast at the beginning of 2022. In Western Europe, Germany will be worst affected, followed by France and Italy. GDP in ‘Developing Europe’, where Ukraine is the largest representative, is expected to shrink by 30%. The war will also add about 2% to global inflation in 2022 and 1% in 2023, compared with NIESR's inflation projection at the beginning of 2022.

**PE02 Economic sanctions: Evolution, consequences, and challenges. Morgan, T. C., Syropoulos, C., & Yotov, Y. V. (2023). *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 37*(1), 3-30.**

Taking an interdisciplinary perspective, we examine the evolution of economic sanctions in the post-World War II era and reflect on the lessons that could be drawn from their features and patterns of use. We observe that, during this time, there has been a remarkable increase in the use of sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. We classify this period into four 'eras' and discuss, in this context, how the evolution of sanctions may be linked to salient features of the contemporaneous international political and economic orders. Our review of the related literatures in economics and political science suggests, among other things, that our understanding of sanction processes could be significantly advanced by marrying these perspectives. We conclude by identifying several questions and challenges, and by discussing how interdisciplinary research could address them.

**PE03 The rise of techno-geopolitical uncertainty: Implications of the United States chips and science act. Luo, Y., & Assche, A. (2023). *Journal of International Business Studies, 54*(8), 1423-1440.**

Growing techno-geopolitical uncertainty affects international business in many ways, calling for more scholarly attention to its causes and multinational enterprise (MNE) responses. The United States CHIPS and Science Act epitomizes the country’s recent embrace of techno-nationalism in its economic rivalry with China, which has major implications for IB scholarship and management practice. The Act exhibits two features that fly against America’s traditional liberal policy stance of championing an open and rules-based multilateral system. First, its reliance on subsidies, export control, and investment screening signifies departure from free trade and from market-based industrial policies. Second, its use of guardrail provisions pursues the weaponization of global value chains for geopolitical and geo-economic purposes. We view the Act as a showcase of a paradigm shift from market-oriented liberalism to intervention-oriented techno-nationalism, heralding a new era of zero-sum thinking and geopolitical prioritization. By examining the broader trend of techno-nationalism, we explore the distinct features of the Act and analyze the geo-strategies that MNEs need to adopt in response to the resulting techno-geopolitical uncertainty. Our analysis highlights the paradigm shift in policymaking, identifies the root causes of this shift, and examines the potential pitfalls it may create. To navigate this uncertain landscape, we suggest four strategic responses for MNEs: geo-strategies, reconfiguration, resilience, and corporate diplomacy.

**PE04 Conflict and intergroup trade: Evidence from the 2014 Russia-Ukraine crisis. Korovkin, V., & Makarin, A. (2023). *American Economic Review, 113*(1), 34-70.**

Does armed conflict reduce trade, even in noncombat areas, through the destruction of intergroup social capital? We analyze Ukrainian trade transactions before and after the 2014 Russia-Ukraine conflict. In a difference-in-differences framework, we find that Ukrainian firms from districts with fewer ethnic Russians experienced a deeper decline in trade with Russia. This decline is economically significant, persistent, and can be explained by erosion of intergroup trust. Affected Ukrainian firms suffered a decrease in performance and diverted trade to other countries. Our results suggest that, through social effects, conflict can be economically damaging even away from combat areas.

**PE05 Political ideology and international capital allocation. Kempf, E., Luo, M., Schäfer, L., & Tsoutsoura, M. (2023). *Journal of Financial Economics, 148*(2), 150-173.**

Does investors' political ideology shape international capital allocation? We provide evidence from two settings--syndicated corporate loans and equity mutual funds--to show ideological alignment with foreign governments affects the cross-border capital allocation by U.S. institutional investors. Ideological alignment on both economic and social issues plays a role. Our empirical strategy ensures direct economic effects of foreign elections or government ties between countries are not driving the result. Ideological distance between countries also explains variation in bilateral investment. Combined, our findings imply ideological alignment is an important, omitted factor in models of international capital allocation.

**PE06 Financial sanctions, swift, and the architecture of the international payment system. Cipriani, M., Goldberg, L. S., & Spada, G. L. (2023). *Journal of Economic Perspectives, 37*(1), 31-52.**

Financial sanctions, alongside economic sanctions, are components of the toolkit used by governments as part of international diplomacy. The use of sanctions, especially financial, has increased over the last 70 years. Financial sanctions have been particularly important whenever the goals of the sanctioning countries were related to democracy and human rights. Financial sanctions restrict entities--countries, businesses, or even individuals--from purchasing or selling financial assets, or from accessing custodial or other financial services. They can be imposed on a sanctioned entity's ability to access the infrastructures that are in place to execute international payments, irrespective of whether such payments underpin financial or real activity. This article explains how financial sanctions can be designed to limit access to the international payments system and, in particular, the SWIFT network, and provides some recent examples.

**PE07 The political economy of international regulatory cooperation. Maggi, G., & Ossa, R. (2023). *American Economic Review, 113*(8), 2168-2200.**

We examine international regulatory agreements that are negotiated under lobbying pressures from producer groups. The way in which lobbying influences the cooperative setting of regulatory policies, as well as the welfare impacts of international agreements, depend crucially on whether the interests of producers in different countries are aligned or in conflict. The former situation tends to occur for product standards, while the latter tends to occur for process standards. We find that, if producer lobbies are strong enough, agreements on product standards lead to excessive deregulation and decrease welfare, while agreements on process standards tighten regulations and enhance welfare.

**PE08 The influence of income, economic policy uncertainty, geopolitical risk, and urbanization on renewable energy investments in G7 countries. Pata, U. K., Alola, A. A., Erdogan, S., & Kartal, M. T. (2023). *Energy Economics, 128*, Article 107172.**

Renewable energy infrastructure development is seen as critical to solving environmental issues. Nevertheless, researchers have not adequately paid attention to how the socioeconomic and geopolitical environment affects renewable energy investments (REINV), which are important for promoting clean energy. In line with this gap, this research aims to analyze the role of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and geopolitical risk (GPR), as well as controlling economic growth (GDP) and urbanization (URB) in G7 countries by considering their leading role in both economic and political areas. To this end, the study applies the augmented mean group (AMG) approach by constructing three different models for the period 2004–2018. The panel data results reveal that (i) GDP has a significantly increasing effect on REINV; (ii) EPU, GPR, and URB have a decreasing effect on REINV; (iii) the effect of EPU is much stronger than that of GPR; (iv) institutional structure, represented by government efficiency and regulatory quality, has no effect on REINV. Based on the results, the study points out that G7 countries need to promote transmission mechanisms that encourage REINV and take steps to minimize the negative effect of EPU and GPR on clean energy investments.

**PE09 Does the carbon emissions trading system reduce carbon emissions by promoting two-way FDI in developing countries? Evidence from Chinese listed companies and cities. Ma, G., Qin, J., & Zhang, Y. (2023). *Energy Economics, 120*, Article 106581.**

How developing countries can effectively promote cities’ carbon emission reduction through the carbon emission trading system (ETS) is a topic worthy of attention in the global carbon reduction campaign. Policy changes in China’s ETS provide a unique opportunity to measure whether ETS impacts carbon emissions through two-way FDI. Hence, this paper employs difference-in-differences (DID) method to test the causal impact of ETS pilot policy on emissions through two-way FDI. The specific results are shown below. We find that the ETS pilot policy’s emission reduction policy significantly inhibited pilot cities’ carbon emissions through two-way FDI. The emission reduction effect is evident in cities with higher administrative levels, better location advantages, and a higher degree of nationalization and energy demand. The mechanism test shows that ETS positively impacts urban carbon emission reduction through the scale, industrial structure, and technical effects of two-way FDI. Among them, the positive effects of technical effect and scale effect are relatively large. The conclusion of this study provides policy enlightenment for giving full play to the carbon reduction effect of the ETS policy. At the same time, it provides experience reference for other developing countries to design ETS for carbon emission control in opening to the outside world.

**PE10 Europe's energy crisis: Are geopolitical risks in source countries of fossil fuels accelerating the transition to renewable energy?. Hille, E.(2023). *Energy Economics, 127*, Article 107061.**

This paper provides first empirical evidence on the effect of geopolitical risks in fossil fuel supplier countries on renewable energy diffusion in fossil fuel importing countries and the mediating roles of rising electricity prices and high import dependence. For this end, aggregate measures of geopolitical risk that countries are exposed to through fossil fuel imports are determined. This is done by combining detailed data on bilateral trade patterns for coal, oil, and natural gas of 37 countries in Europe with that on geopolitical risks in supplier countries. Using an instrumental variable approach, the study reveals that geopolitical risks in supplier countries tended to foster renewable energy diffusion in Europe during the period 1991–2021. The effects are especially pronounced for geopolitical risks related to coal and natural gas imports, while the importance of risks related to particular fossil fuels differed for the build-up of the individual renewable energies, i.e. wind, solar, and biomass. Rising electricity prices and high import dependence, particularly for coal, partially amplified the effects on renewable energy diffusion. Despite the high import dependence, natural gas appears to have played in part a role as a bridging technology for energy transition.

**PE11 Geopolitical oil price uncertainty transmission into core inflation: Evidence from two of the biggest global players. Lee, C., Olasehinde-Williams, G., & Özkan, O. (2023). *Energy Economics, 126*, Article 106983.**

This research argues that inflation indirectly correlates with geopolitics through the oil markets. The argument is that uncertainties generated by geopolitics are often transmitted into core inflation through oil prices, and we provide empirical evidence to support this by establishing an uncertainty-oil-macroeconomy nexus for the biggest oil importing countries, the U.S. and China. The study specifically examines whether there are indirect contributions of geopolitical oil price uncertainty to inflation that appear in core inflation, excluding the more volatile food and energy prices. It employs a non-parametric quantile causality technique for analyzing how geopolitical oil price uncertainty and core inflation interact in both countries and conducts rolling windows-based non-parametric quantile causality analysis for robustness. The full-time non-parametric quantile causality results show that geopolitical oil price risk strongly affects core inflation both in mean and variance, especially in the mid-quantiles, and that its effect is greater in variance relative to mean for both countries. The rolling windows-based outcomes indicate that geopolitical oil price risk exerts an increasing influence on core inflation during important geopolitical events such as the Euro crisis, Brexit, presidential elections, trade wars, and COVID-19, and these impacts differ not only between countries, but also according to whether causality is mean or variance. Finally, the significance of the findings is discussed.

**PE12 Going global? CEO political ideology and the choice between international alliances and international acquisitions. Chandler, J. A., Kim, Y. (., Waddingham, J. A., & Hill, A. D. (2023). *Journal of International Business Studies, 54*(8), 1441-1470.**

Drawing on upper echelons theory and political science research, we investigate how CEO political ideology influences a firm’s choice between international alliances and international acquisitions as an entry mode into foreign markets. Due to their ideological differences, we find that firms led by more liberal CEOs are more likely to use international alliances when entering a foreign market while firms led by more conservative CEOs are more likely to use international acquisitions as an entry mode choice. We also examine how these political preferences of CEOs can be mitigated by more vigilant boards. We find that the effect of CEO political ideology on the choice between international alliances and international acquisitions is mitigated by greater board independence and greater independent director shareholdings in the firm. However, contrary to our expectations, we find that separating the CEO and board chair positions has no effect on this relationship, suggesting that CEOs’ political preferences shape such choices regardless of whether CEOs are also the chair of the board. In general, our findings indicate the importance of CEO political values as a predictor of a firm’s approach to foreign market entry strategies.

**PE13 Reforming European electricity markets: Lessons from the energy crisis. Fabra, N.(2023). *Energy Economics, 126*, Article 106959.**

The surge in gas prices due to the Ukrainian war has sparked a European energy crisis, triggering discussions about overhauling electricity markets. The European Commission (EC) proposes maintaining short-term electricity markets, fostering long-term Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) and Contracts-for-Differences (CfDs), and permitting Member States to regulate retail prices during emergencies. This paper proposes a market design aligning with the EC’s plan while introducing additional elements to address its limitations. Notably, it advocates an enhanced reliance on CfDs tailored to the attributes of the generation technologies. This approach seeks to strike a balance by exposing technologies to short-term price signals while allocating investment risks efficiently.

**PE14 Evolutionary game on international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Xin, B., & Zhang, M. (2023). *Energy Economics, 125*, Article 106827.**

The Russia-Ukraine conflict has triggered the global energy crisis and been one wrench in global energy markets. A surge in global energy prices is sent inflation soaring worldwide. Where are global energy markets heading? To address the wrench, we construct a tripartite energy evolutionary game including Russia, Part A countries (mainly those imposing sanctions on Russia), and Part B countries (mainly those not imposing sanctions on Russia) to depict the international energy trade under the Russia-Ukraine conflict. The results show that: (i) Part A countries' optimal economic strategy can not affect the Russian and Part B countries' strategies, and they choose to import Russian energy; (ii) All participants' strategies converge to stable states, and Russia's strategy converges faster; (iii) Russian and Part B countries' strategies are more stable than Part A countries'; (iv) Installing price caps will aggravate Part A countries' energy crises. A diplomatic effort is the best way for all participants to avert an escalation of the energy crisis.

**PE15 Energy security and economic stability: The role of inflation and war. Banna, H., Alam, A., Chen, X. H., & Alam, A. W. (2023). *Energy Economics, 126*, Article 106949.**

This paper investigates the impact of energy security risk (ESR) on economic stability. Using multiple global datasets, we provide empirical evidence from a panel of 68 countries spanning over a period from 1980 to 2021. Our results indicate that high ESR reduces GDP growth rate (GDPG) from a global perspective. In robustness tests, this effect remains valid across several specifications based on non-U.S. samples, national income-level, alternative measure of economic stability, and a set of endogeneity tests based on propensity score matching estimation. Countries with pre-existing low GDPG mainly suffer from heightened energy insecurity. Further tests reveal that numerous country-specific institutional quality estimates moderate the effect. Finally, the damaging impact of ESR worsens during years of high inflation, geopolitical risk and acts, as well as of escalated war threats. We encourage international collaborations to develop a more sustainable energy system, which enhances the security of energy supply and the stability of economy.